Location check-ins contain both geographical and semantic information about the visited venues, in the form of tags (e.g., "restaurant"). Such data might reveal some personal information about users beyond what they actually want to disclose, hence their privacy is threatened. In this paper, we study users' motivations behind location check-ins, and we quantify the effect of a privacy-preserving technique (i.e., generalization) on the perceived utility of check-ins. By means of a targeted userstudy on Foursquare (N = 77), we show that the motivation behind Foursquare check-ins is a mediator of the loss of utility caused by generalization. Using these findings, we propose a machinelearning method for determining the motivation behind each check-in, and we design a motivation-based predictive model for utility. Our results show that the model accurately predicts the loss of utility caused by semantic and geographical generalization; this model enables the design of utility-aware, privacy-enhancing mechanisms in location-based social networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and Foursquare, allow their users to share location information with each other. Such a feature is quite popular, as 30% of users attach locations to their posts [36] . The reason for sharing locations include the desire to connect with users' social circles and to project an interesting image of themselves [27] , [28] , thus achieving a goal greater than simply disclosing geographical information [12] , [21] .
By checking-in to a place or an event, on so-called locationbased social networks (LBSNs), such as a restaurant or a gathering, users implicitly accept to reveal the geographical coordinates and the semantic information of the place. For example, when they check in to a restaurant, users reveal the exact location of that restaurant, as well as its type or * This work was carried out while the author was with EPFL. † This work was carried out while the author was with ETH Zurich. category, represented in the form of tags, such as "burger joint" (venue types are usually selected from a pre-defined set of tags, organized as a hierarchical tree, where the "burger joint" tag could be a descendant of the "restaurant" tag.). This might lead to the exposure of additional private information beyond what they intended to share. A collection of location checkins by a set of users can lead to their re-identification and also an inference of more personal information (e.g., complete location trace, co-travelers, activities) [7] , [30] , [35] . The risks are even higher when users share semantic information as well. For example, activity patterns can be learned at the semantic level (e.g., users go to cinemas after dining in restaurants) and subsequently used to better track users' locations.
To protect their privacy, users can obfuscate their location information, both at the geographical and semantic levels. For example, a user can generalize 1 the semantic information of the venue by sharing, for example, "restaurant" instead of "burger joint". The user can also generalize the geographical location of the venue by sharing, for instance, the city instead of the full address of the venue. Location obfuscation decreases the chances that a curious entity can track the location and activities of the user over time, hence it increases the user's privacy. However, this might come at the cost of a reduction in her perceived quality of service (i.e., utility).
Because it is difficult for users to estimate the privacy risks that stem from location sharing (it usually requires to perform statistical inference [30] ) and because it would be cumbersome for users to manually select the level of obfuscation to apply to each of their check-ins, automatic obfuscation mechanisms are needed (note that automatically generated privacy recommendations are valuable as well [18] ). In order to balance privacy and utility, such mechanisms must be able to quantify the effect of obfuscation on both privacy and utility. Formal frameworks have been proposed to quantify location privacy, e.g., [30] . However, few studies address the utility loss due to location obfuscation for particular location-based services [15] , [23] , or the utility loss in a formal framework for finding the optimal balance between utility and privacy [31] . Despite these studies, there is no methodology for modeling and predicting the perceived utility loss that stems from the use of obfuscation mechanisms in location-based social networks for each individual check-in (for each individual user). This paper provides such a methodology in order to design automatic personalized location privacy protection mechanisms.
The problem of predicting a user's perceived utility loss due to obfuscation is highly intertwined with the problem of identifying why the user shares her location in the first place. In this paper, we propose to first infer the motivation of the user in sharing her location, and then to predict the utility implications of a privacy-protection mechanism on the user's experience with respect to that particular motivation. 2 This determines which level of location obfuscation is acceptable to the user. For example, a user might only want to convey the message that she is performing a certain activity, such as "eating" in a given city, without revealing the exact type or address of the place where the activity is happening. In another example, consider a user who checks in to a restaurant in Hawaii; if her motivation is to invite some friends, then the full address of the venue is needed, but if she wants to let her friends know she is having a good time on vacation, then coarse grain information about the place, e.g., "restaurant in Hawaii", suffices.
In order to find the right balance between the level of obfuscation and the utility requirements of each user, we use machine learning algorithms that, given some features about a check-in (and the user's behavior), predict her motivation for this check-in and her perceived utility loss for each level of (geographical and semantic) location obfuscation. The result of our algorithm is a personalized utility loss function. We implement and test our methodology on the results of an online survey involving 77 Foursquare users (with 45 check-ins per user). We can predict the purpose of the check-ins (among 13 pre-selected purposes) with a raw correct classification rate of 43% and the effect of obfuscation on utility (on a scale from 1 to 5) with a mean prediction error of 0.66.
The results of our survey also shed light on the effects of location obfuscation mechanisms on the perceived utility by users in location check-in applications. In particular, our results indicate that semantic obfuscation (e.g., reporting "restaurant" instead of "burger joint") has a significantly larger negative impact on the perceived utility, compared to geographic obfuscation (e.g., reporting the city instead of the full address).
In summary, our contributions are as follows: 1) We present the first methodology, to the best of our knowledge, for inferring the motivations behind users' location check-ins and their effect on users' perceived utility loss that is caused by different levels of location obfuscation (for both the semantic and geographical information). 2) We design a utility loss function that can be used as a building block for designing usable location privacyprotection mechanisms. Such mechanisms could automatically choose the best obfuscation level that matches the users' preferences in terms of utility (or simply make suggestions and let the users choose). 3) We study the trade-off between utility and privacy in a location-based social network, namely Foursquare, based on the results of a survey of Foursquare users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing the related work in Section II, we present the methodology of our study in Section III, which includes an online survey with Foursquare users, and the definition of the motivation and utility inference framework. Subsequently, we present quantitative results, by discussing both descriptive statistics and performance values of our motivation classifier and utility model in Sections IV and V respectively. We then discuss the limitations of our study, conclude the paper and give directions for future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
From a high-level perspective, there are two broad categories of study on location-sharing behavior and privacy that are related to our work: (i) users' motivations for sharing location in online social networks, and (ii) location obfuscation techniques and their effect on perceived utility.
A. Motivations behind Location Sharing
Recently, several works investigated the users' motivations for disclosing their locations in online social networks. Patil et al. [27] , [28] carried out two online user-studies, with 401 and 362 participants respectively, and studied the users' motivations for sharing locations on location-based social networks (in particular on Foursquare). The results show that users' main motivations include the desire to connect with their social circles and to project an interesting image of themselves. In particular, their motivations for sharing location information included the desire to tell friends that they like a place, to keep their social circle informed of where they are, to record their visits and to appear "cool" and interesting. As a consequence, the primary reason for "checking in" appears to be related more to attaining a higher-level objective, such as sharing a positive experience or to appear "cool", rather than to pointing to a specific geographical location. Similarly, results presented in [12] , [21] also show that social connections and impression management play a cardinal role in users' location-sharing activities in Foursquare. Following these results, we adopt the motivation labels described in [27] , [28] as the default options available to users for selecting the main purposes of their check-ins. In order not to restrict users to one of the predefined choices, we also offer them the option for entering a purpose that is not present in the predefined list. Cramer et al. [5] performed an in-deep qualitative study of users' motivations for checking in on Foursquare (e.g., reasons, context, audience), based on interviews (N = 20) and survey responses (N = 47). The main reasons for sharing location that they extracted from their interview responses match the motivation labels considered in this paper. One of their findings is that check-ins serve a utilitarian purpose (e.g., coordinate with friends) which shows the need for utility models (that we provide in this paper). The authors also investigate the importance of the audience of check-ins and the perception of a user's check-ins by her friends. Although related to our work, none of the aforementioned papers tackles the inference of the motivation behind check-ins and the design of (motivation-based) utility models for check-ins when using location obfuscation techniques.
B. Location Obfuscation
Location privacy is a well-studied topic in mobile networks. Many location obfuscation mechanisms have been proposed, including reducing the granularity of the location (generalization), adding noise to the geographical location, adding fake location information, hiding location information, and changing identifiers [1] , [4] , [11] , [15] , [17] .
Brush et al. [3] studied the users' preferences and concerns for several such algorithms by visually showing the result of each of them to the users. Although the evaluation showed that the users understood the basic effects of the different algorithms, the authors highlighted a significant lack of awareness of long-term threats. A related effort by Tang et al. [32] presents the users with three different visualizations of their past shared locations and studies their effect on the end-user privacy. They show that, based on the type of visualization, the users expressed diverging attitudes towards the people with whom they shared their locations.
There are also targeted studies on the usability of the proposed location obfuscation techniques for mobile applications [14] , [23] . In particular, Micinski et al. [23] study the relationship between location obfuscation and application utility on the Android platform. By means of an Android tool, called CloakDroid, they show that providing applications with less precise locations does not substantially hinder their functionality. A more encompassing approach, taken by Henne et al. [14] , enables Android users to specify different obfuscation algorithms for each Android application, including location truncation.
As users are not able to anticipate the privacy threats against them caused by the information they share, there are several attempts to formalize the desirable location privacy requirements that obfuscation mechanisms should fulfill and the metrics to quantify them. Examples of such pieces of work are Krumm [19] , Decker [8] , and Duckham [9] . In a follow-up of these works, Shokri et al. provide a framework [30] to quantify location privacy, and a game-theoretic methodology [31] to optimize location privacy while respecting users' utility requirements. Despite all the efforts to design obfuscation mechanisms and quantify their effect on users' location privacy, no methodology is proposed for quantitatively estimating the utility loss caused by different obfuscation mechanisms. Few studies that include utility aspects of location obfuscation mechanisms only reflect the application dimension of it, for example, by measuring the fraction of restaurants that a user misses, or the error of traffic information due to location perturbation [15] , [23] . Our work completes this line of studies, by providing a methodology to design user-centric utility functions for location check-ins.
III. SURVEY AND DATA COLLECTION
In this work, we investigate (on a per-check-in basis) the effect of geographical and semantic location obfuscation (i.e., generalization) on the perceived utility of (Foursquare) check-ins. In order to better understand users' behaviors and preferences when they check into venues, we ran a user study in early 2014. The study consists of a personalized online survey, where participants are asked to provide additional information about their past check-ins on Foursquare. Foursquare is a very popular location-based mobile social network (unlike Facebook, users can only check-in from their mobile devices), whose primary feature is to check-in to venues: From the Foursquare mobile application or website, users can select a venue close to their current location (from the Foursquare database) and share their presence at this venue, possibly together with a text message and some pictures. 3 Each venue is associated with a street address and a semantic tag (from a predefined set of tags, organized as a tree). Foursquare also provides incentives (e.g., badges, "mayorship", and rewards upon check-in) and gaming features (e.g., treasure hunts in which participants must check-in at specific venues).
In the survey, we ask the participants to state the purpose of some of their past Foursquare check-ins, as well as to specify to what extent their purpose would still be met if their checkins were obfuscated at several levels (both geographical and semantic). Our findings are then used to evaluate an automated system that predicts the purpose and the extent to which such a purpose would still be met, if the original check-in were replaced by an obfuscated version of it.
In the following subsections, we discuss the details about the participants and the contents of the survey.
A. Participants and Remuneration
To recruit participants, we made use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform, which allowed us to draw candidates from a pool of users with diverse backgrounds and to limit the bias of the results towards academic and student behavior, inherent to on-campus surveys. We screened participants according to the following criteria: (i) aged between 18 and 80 years, (ii) with an active Foursquare account, (iii) with at least 75 check-ins over the last 24 months, (iv) with at least 20 check-ins containing some text. Furthermore, to ensure a minimal level of diversity in the check-ins, we allowed only the participants who had checked-in to at least 15 different venues, stemming from at least 5 different venue types (with at least 2 different venues for each type). Note that we only considered venues that have both precise geographic and semantic information, and that have a non-negligible number of unique visitors. Moreover, we screened the MTurk participants according to their past performance on the platform: They had to have a minimum Human Intelligence Task (HIT) approval rate of 95% and at least 100 past approved HITs. This was a preliminary step to preventing inexperienced and non-serious workers from participating in our survey.
Our survey is based on the participants' actual check-ins on Foursquare posted over the last 24 months (that we collected through a specific application we developed), and it requires a significant amount of time to complete (30-45 minutes). To encourage the participants to participate in the survey and to grant us access to their Foursquare data, we rewarded them with a fixed amount of money (US $4.5 per HIT [2] , [22] ). At the end of the study, the average per-hour remuneration for the participants was US $8.50. The total budget for the experiment was $600.
B. Online Survey
The survey, divided into two parts, was composed of a total of 68 questions. In the first part, participants replied to 18 questions pertaining to general demographics, as well as technology and location-sharing habits. The remaining 45 questions were constructed by using information collected from the users' own Foursquare check-ins.
Before beginning the survey, the participants were presented with a welcome page that indicated the scope and purpose of the study. After agreeing with the privacy and data use policies 4 , they were asked to log in to their Foursquare account and grant us access to their check-ins and friend lists. After this step, our application verified if the participants actually fulfilled the admission criteria and, if so, it allowed them to continue to the first (static) set of questions.
Following the first part, the participants were presented with the second (personalized) part of the survey, where they answered a set of 9 questions for each of the 45 check-ins, totaling 405 personalized questions. For each of their checkins, the participants were presented with the time of the checkin, the venue (its name and its location displayed on a map), and the associated text message, if any (see Figure 1 ). 5 These questions allowed participants to select one answer per question item, among a set of pre-defined choices. We asked participants to state (1) the primary and (optionally) secondary purpose of the check-in, (2) whether the text in the check-in is related to the location, (3) the extent to which the purpose of the check-in would still be met if it were replaced by a less detailed check-in (we had four different versions with varying levels of geographical and semantic obfuscation), (4) the most important detail in the check-in and (5) the most similar check-in in terms of purpose, among two other suggested check-ins present in the user's own questions. In particular, for (1) we allowed users to either select one among a set of 13 proposed choices (based on [27] , [28] and our internal experiment) or to specify a different one in free-text.
We considered two levels of obfuscation (low and high), both at the geographical and at the semantic levels. Geographic obfuscation reveals only some of the geographic information (among the street number, street name, zip code, city, state, and country); semantic obfuscation reveals only an ancestor, in Foursquare's semantic hierarchy, of the semantic tag of the venue (in our dataset, semantic tags have 3 to 4 ancestors). The four combinations of obfuscation levels are defined as follows and are illustrated on a sample venue in Table I: 
1) Low semantic obfuscation, Low geographical obfuscation (Ls-Lg):
Instead of the full venue information, we show only the immediate ancestor in the semantic hierarchy of the venue, and we display only the street name/city/state/country (without the street number).
2) High semantic, Low geographical (Hs-Lg):
We show the second ancestor, and display the street name/city/state/country. 
3) Low semantic, High geographical (Ls-Hg):
We show the immediate ancestor, and display the city/state/country.
4) High semantic, High geographical (Hs-Hg):
We show the second ancestor, and display the city/state/country.
Geographical obfuscation relies on the Google Geocoding API to convert the venue addresses to a structured format (street number, street name, zipcode, city, state, country), whereas semantic obfuscation relies on the tree structure of the set of tags provided by Foursquare. Table I shows an example of a check-in with the four alternatives, where a participant has to state, on a discrete 5-point scale (where 1 means "Not at all" and 5 means "Perfectly"), the extent to which her purpose would still be met if her original check-in were replaced by each of the alternative ones. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of our survey website for a sample check-in.
In order to detect and discard sloppy answers, we performed two tests: time analysis and purpose diversity. For both parts of the survey, we analyzed how long it took participants to complete them, and we discarded the participants whose timings were lower than twice the standard deviation around the mean time. Regarding the diversity in the stated purpose, we retained participants who chose at least two distinct purposes at least twice in their answers. To avoid wasting participants' time, we did not include "dummy" questions in the survey, as our previous experience showed they were answered correctly, even by the participants who provided sloppy answers. create a set of 13 dummy binary variables {m d } 13 d=1 to encode the 13 possible purposes; similarly, we generate 4 dummy variables for the time of the day to encode 5 different possibilities (morning, noon, etc.). Moreover, we take into account the correlation and mutual dependence between obfuscation and purpose by having them appear as factors in the regression function. In the end, we obtain 13 binary variables for the purpose (m d ), 3 variables for the obfuscation levels (o s ·o g , o s , o g ) and 23 for the venue and user characteristics, where each of the 7 variables k i is converted to several binary variables k (j) . The linear regression function is defined as:
where a 0 , b i , c i , e i are the coefficients that we estimate by using the least squares method. Second, we use the WEKA toolkit in order to evaluate the non-linear model and ascertain whether there is a significant difference between the two models. We expect the non-linear model to perform better than the linear one; however, the linear model will provide us with results that can be interpreted on a per-feature basis, and will allow us to compare their relative coefficients in the regression function, as shown hereafter.
A. Linear Model of Utility vs. Purpose 1) Actual Purpose vs. Utility: In this scenario, we consider the actual reported purposes of the check-ins when optimizing the regression coefficients. Hence, the purpose vector m is a binary vector, where there is at most one occurrence of the value 1 for each such vector.
The linear model achieves a R 2 = 0.20, with a mean error of 1.19 over the range [1, 5] , and a p-value < .01. In terms of motivation coefficients, we observe that the largest has a value −0.63 (p < .01) for the purpose "inform about people around me", whereas the only one that has a positive effect on utility is "say that I like it", with a value of 0.41 (p < .01). In general, most motivation predictors are significant, although they have a relatively small contribution (< −0.3) on the overall utility. With respect to the coefficients for the semantic and geographic obfuscation, we observe that both of them have a negative effect on utility (−0.73 and −0.40, respectively). However, there is also a clear difference in their magnitudes: The one for the semantic obfuscation is almost two times higher than the one for the geographic obfuscation. In this respect, our findings corroborate the prior results in [27] , [28] , by quantifying the impact on the utility of both different motivations and levels of detail [26] for real Foursquare check-ins.
Overall, the regression results show that when the actual purposes are known, the linear model does not achieve good results in terms of fit, and it still maintains a modest mean error over the considered range. It shows, however, how some of the motivations and obfuscation parameters are indeed significant for the prediction of utility.
2) Inferred Purpose vs. Utility: In this scenario, the actual purpose of the check-in is not known. As a consequence, the purpose vector is not a binary vector anymore but it contains probabilities, as they are output by the SVM purpose classifier of the previous stage. On the one hand, this provides less certainty about the actual purpose of the check-in; on the other hand, it enables a linear combination of purposes to be expressed in the regression function, instead of a single one.
The regression results for this scenario show that, overall, the linear model achieves a slightly better fit (R 2 = 0.21) and a slightly lower mean error (1.18), where p < .01. In terms of coefficients of the purpose parameters, we observe that they are all positive and larger than 8, as the purpose vector contains the probability distribution over purposes, and thus larger coefficients can be used for the regression. The largest predictor is the same as in the previous case, i.e., "inform about people around" (value of 32.45, p < .01). Moreover, the coefficients of the other parameters (obfuscation and user features) are similar to the previous case as well. The intercept is negative at −10.8.
Compared to the case where the actual purposes are known, the inferred purposes achieve overall similar results, although we observe a slight improvement of 5% in terms of overall fit of the model for the case where the purpose classifier is used. This suggests that better results can be achieved for the linear model, by allowing for a larger flexibility in terms of purposes. We believe that, in practice, this is to be expected as users who check into places usually do so for a combination of purposes, rather than a single one. In our dataset, we also collected information about an optional secondary purpose, but we obtained too few entries for such an information.
B. Non-linear Model of Utility vs. Purpose
In order to overcome possible limitations of the linear model, we compared the previous results with those obtained by using a non-linear model based on the model tree technique M5P [34] . This model produces a tree of regression models, where linear regression functions are found at the nodes of the tree. We performed the regression over all the check-ins in WEKA, using 10-fold cross validation.
We first consider the case where the actual purposes are known. The regression produces significantly better results in terms of mean absolute error of prediction, which is 0.66 compared to 1.19 of the linear model (-56%), by taking into account 362 rules present in the tree. As expected, the nonlinear model performs better than the linear one, as the M5P model is better able to model the complex subtleties of the users perceived utility. The correlation coefficient of the overall model is also relatively high (81%). In particular, we observe that the users' age is the first attribute that is considered in the M5P output tree, i.e., the age provides the largest reduction in the error of the utility regression function: For participants who are less than 33 years old, the subsequent attribute is the level of semantic obfuscation; however, for participants that are older, the subsequent attribute is the frequency of visiting the second-ancestor of the check-in venue. This finding shows how participants that belong to distinct age groups seem to use different criteria when evaluating the utility of checkins after they are obfuscated. As part of future work, we intend to further study the relationship between motivationbased features and demographic ones, by means of a semistructured interviews in addition to online surveys. For the case where the purposes are inferred and not known, we observe a month in the past), or by including additional information to help participants remember about the context of their check-in (e.g., attached pictures). Finally, the use of a 5-point scale to quantify utility (with only the 1 and 5 options annotated) could lead to different interpretation between participants.
We intend to overcome some of the aforementioned limitations by integrating a larger number of participants through more diverse advertisement campaigns that, in addition to MTurk, include a broader set of people from other countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the users' motivations for checking in on a popular platform (Foursquare), and we design an automated mechanism to infer and exploit these motivations, in order to reduce the amount of excessive details that are released by a check-in. First, we show that the purposes of check-ins play a significant role in determining their utility for the users, after we remove or replace some details on the semantic and geographic levels. In particular, we show that obfuscating (or reducing) information on the semantic level has a significantly more negative effect on the utility of the check-ins, compared to obfuscating on the geographic level.
By exploiting these insights, we design and evaluate an automated purpose inference mechanism, showing that it achieves a performance that is two times better than the baseline. Furthermore, we re-use the output of the inference mechanism to build and evaluate a regression model for utility, given the purpose of the check-in and the level of obfuscation. We show that a non-linear characterization of utility achieves a small prediction error (0.68 over the range [1, 5] ), and we show that for more than 60% of users' check-ins, at least one of the proposed obfuscation methods can be used without significantly damaging their utility. This makes it possible for application and system developers, using generalization techniques, to incorporate privacy-preserving tools that have a negligible effect on the usability of the system, yet provide a higher level of privacy to the users. For instance, such a tool could choose the appropriate level of obfuscation (in terms of utility, based on-among other things-the inferred motivation behind the check-in) and either directly apply this level of obfuscation to the shared information or make a suggestion to the user and let her choose the level of obfuscation she prefers.
Beyond helping model the perceived utility, inferring the purposes of individual location check-ins can reveal useful to create new features on LBSNs. For example, users could be offered the "directions to the venue" feature for check-ins which purpose is "Wish people to join me" or offered to share a group picture for check-ins which purpose is "Inform about people around me". More generally, the classification of the check-ins (wrt their purposes) could be used to automatically adjust the way the check-in history is presented to the users.
As part of future work, in addition to overcoming some of the limitations we discussed, we plan to provide further insight into behavioral patterns and provide explanations for the regression models, by collaborating with experts from social psychology at partner institutions. Moreover, we intend to study the differences, in terms of check-in behaviors (and the implications on the perceived utility of check-ins), between different LBSNs. Finally, we plan to run a trial (based on an mobile app that allows users to obfuscate their check-ins) in order to assess the potential of our approach in the wild.
